Keith argues cogently that :
> MABS practice is based on (usually unstated) ontological assumptions, that
> only individuals exist, and that macrosocial entities do not exist. In
> sociology, this stance is known as either "nominalism" or "individualism."
> MABS goes further than this ontological individualism, and assumes the
> stronger stance of methodological individualism as well: MABS explicitly
> models AGENTS, but does not explicitly model social entities (groups,
> institutions, norms/conventions/rules conceptualized as collective
> entities, not simply shared psychological entities). These collective
> entities are not considered to be "real" and are not considered to be
> capable of causal power: "epiphenomenal." MABS methodology is
> epiphenomenalist about the social.
If so this is a problem. In my own field (architecture and urban planning)
agents inhabit an environment. That environment is modelled and although it
is not an agent in its own right it has direct effects on agents as well as
on the interactions between agents. Agents cant see or walk through walls,
so the structure of space has direct effects on movement patterns, and those
in turn have effects on agent-agent co-presence which has effects on
communication and transaction patterns. In this model 'agency' is only given
to individals, but what emerges from a higher level contraint acting on all
individuals (the environment with a structure to it) are apparently
recognisable patterns of interaction that we might interpret in sociological
ways.
Could it be that all supra-individual structures can be modelled in this way
as constraints? I could see legal, regulatory and other social rules in this
form. The more mechanical the easier, but statistical rules are equally
possible. Liklihood of inter- class or inter-ethnic marriage for example can
be modelled probabilistically. In this way social groups and institutions
appear in a model without ascribing agency to them.
Certainly for me these collective constraints are not epiphenomenal and are
causal. As are the collective phenomena that follow (emerge) from them -
encounter probabilities in spatial systems between different social groups
lead directly to liklihood of communication and 'useful' conversations (in
real world work organisations). I havent yet reproduced this kind of finding
in an agent based model - but I cant see why it would not happen.
I think I am disagreeing with Keith - you dont need to ascribe agency to
collective structures in order not to be individualist....
Alan
%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%%
|